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The role of false belief in establishing children’s social relationships during the transition to school was exam-
ined and compared to other social cognitive constructs. One hundred and fourteen 5-year-olds were recruited
during their 1st year of school (Time 1); 106 children were retained 1 year later. False belief, emotion expres-
sion recognition, empathy, verbal ability, and peer-rated social preference were measured at both times. False
belief at Time 1 had a direct inﬂuence on concurrent social preference, over and above the inﬂuence of emo-
tion expression recognition and empathy. False belief made no independent contribution to later social prefer-
ence accounting for stability in social preference. The role of social cognitive development is discussed with
respect to how children establish and maintain their position in a peer group.
The successful management of peer relations has
far-reaching implications for later socioemotional
well-being, academic performance, and school
adjustment (Johnson, Ironsmith, Snow, & Poteat,
2000; McDougall, Hymel, Vaillancourt, & Mercer,
2001; Parker & Asher, 1987). One feature of young
children that has received sustained attention
because of its presumed inﬂuence on peer social
relationships is theory of mind (ToM), the ability to
understand other’s actions in terms of mental states
(Wellman, 1990). Although ToM, and its core com-
ponent false-belief (FB) understanding (Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001), is thought to be a funda-
mental skill enabling children to function adap-
tively in social situations, few studies have
addressed the question of how FB over time is
linked with the ability to establish and maintain peer
relationships.
A recent meta-analysis by Slaughter, Imuta, Pet-
erson, and Henry (2014) highlights the need to clar-
ify the longitudinal impact of ToM on social
relationships, both from a theoretical standpoint to
determine whether individual differences in ToM
do in fact have an important and lasting inﬂuence
on later social relationships, and from an applied
clinical standpoint to inform the design and timing
of interventions for children at risk of social isola-
tion. The few existing longitudinal studies (Baner-
jee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011; Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin,
& Banerjee, 2012) have not yet examined the spe-
ciﬁc and unique inﬂuence of FB on social relation-
ships during the ﬁrst years of formal schooling, a
key time in a child’s life when he or she is negotiat-
ing a new social context. Importantly, this period
covers both the initial establishment of relationships
in a new peer group and the maintenance of these
relations. To address this gap in the literature, the
current study comprises a longitudinal examination
of the inﬂuence of FB on children’s social relation-
ships during the ﬁrst 2 years of formal schooling.
Furthermore, in addition to examining how and
when the inﬂuence of FB on social relationships
may come about, it is crucial to distinguish the
inﬂuence of FB on social relationships from the
likely inﬂuences of closely related domains of chil-
dren’s social cognition, such as their ability to rec-
ognize emotional expressions and their empathic
orientation (de Rosnay, Harris, & Pons, 2008; Saarni,
1999). Thus, in the current study, we employ a
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longitudinal approach to determine the respective
roles of FB, emotion expression recognition, and
empathic orientation in establishing children’s social
relationships in the 1st year of formal schooling,
and whether early FB has an independent, longitu-
dinal inﬂuence on children’s later social relation-
ships during their 2nd year of schooling.
There are two key accounts for why FB should
be related to children’s social relationships. First,
consistent with the early proposal of Lalonde and
Chandler (1995), children with more advanced FB
may be at an advantage when establishing peer
relationships because they are better able to under-
stand the perspectives of their peers; that is, FB
allows children to read and respond to complex
social situations more effectively (Astington, 2001;
Astington & Jenkins, 2000; Hughes & Leekam,
2004; Moore & Frye, 1991). Second, the social nat-
ure of peer interaction itself may provide opportu-
nities for children to hone their understanding of
mind (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). Taken together, a
reciprocal association is plausible, such that chil-
dren with better FB are more able to adapt to social
interactions and manage relationships more effec-
tively, which in turn provides a social context that
supports the growth of their psychological under-
standing, including their FB (Dockett & Degotardi,
1997; Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002). It is this
theoretical supposition that a longitudinal approach
is uniquely able to examine.
Based on these two accounts of the possible rela-
tions between FB and social relationships, predic-
tions can be made about expected concurrent and
longitudinal relations between them. The most
straightforward prediction is that young children
use their FB understanding directly to manage their
social interactions, and therefore, higher levels of
FB understanding should predict more effective
social interactions concurrently, once children have
had some time to learn about each other in a school
context (Denham & Holt, 1993). In this view, it
might also be expected that children with higher
levels of FB in the 1st year of school will fare more
favorably with peers a year later, and it is impor-
tant to examine this possible longitudinal associa-
tion. It is also important to note that if this view is
correct, longitudinal stability in children’s social
relationships may to some extent turn on the endur-
ing inﬂuence of individual differences in FB under-
standing. This point is elaborated below.
In addition to the view that FB may exert a
direct inﬂuence on social relationships, Astington
(2001) has argued: “A more important question,
perhaps, is whether there are consequences of an
early understanding of false-belief that endure and
are apparent later on” (p. 687). Astington’s ques-
tion, while raised in relation to preschool children,
expresses an important developmental possibility:
Earlier individual differences in FB may set in
motion distinctive sociodevelopmental pathways
that take on their own momentum. In the context
of the current investigation, the enduring conse-
quences of early individual differences in FB may
be that children’s social position, which reﬂects
their social track record, becomes self-maintaining
(Denham & Holt, 1993; de Rosnay et al., 2008;
Ladd, Price, & Hart, 1988). In this view, children’s
position in a social network, once established,
should be relatively stable because it reﬂects inher-
ent (social) structure, and one would thus predict,
given a relatively stable social environment, that
social position is resilient to change. Interestingly,
this view implies that the inﬂuence of child factors
(i.e., social understanding, including FB) on social
relationships should be strongest when children
enter new environments.
Given the importance placed on FB for inﬂuenc-
ing and shaping peer interaction, it is crucial to
choose an appropriate index to measure children’s
social relationships. The enduring nature of social
structures in school settings is arguably captured in
peer-rated measures of sociometric status or social
preference. Social preference was speciﬁcally chosen
to capture the complex nature of social relation-
ships, as each child’s social preference score com-
prises a composite score from multiple peer raters.
This provides a unique insight into how children’s
social relationships are perceived and integrated in
their peer group at school. Such insights are not
typically captured by teacher- or parent-rated mea-
sures of social competencies (e.g., Babad, 2001;
Cillessen & Mayeux, 2004; French & Waas, 1986).
While the fundamental function of ToM under-
standing is to “master social situations” (Begeer,
Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010), no study has
directly examined how early-appearing social prefer-
ence—a sociometric index—and FB—an individual
cognitive capacity—inﬂuence each other both con-
currently and over time. The current literature with
4- to 7-year-olds offers some support for concurrent
and longitudinal associations between ToM and chil-
dren’s social behavior, more broadly construed. For
example, parent and teacher ratings of children’s
social competencies (e.g., prosocial behavior and
social skills) have been shown to be associated with
FB and other ToM measures (e.g., Eggum et al.,
2011; Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Watson, Nixon, Wilson,
& Capage, 1999; Weimer & Guajardo, 2005; see also
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Astington, 2003, for a review). While these studies
point to the importance of FB throughout elementary
school, they do not measure children’s social rela-
tionships directly. As such, it remains necessary to
assess the relation between FB and social relation-
ships via peer report rather than rely solely on
broader questionnaire indices of social competence.
Studies that have speciﬁcally investigated con-
current associations between FB and peer-rated
social relationships have typically yielded mixed
results. Higher FB understanding scores have
indeed been associated with peer acceptance or
popularity within the peer group (e.g., Dockett &
Degotardi, 1997; Peterson & Siegal, 2002). For
example, Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, Zubernis, and
Balaraman (2003) reported a signiﬁcant, albeit mod-
est, concurrent association between ToM under-
standing (including FB) and peer-rated likability in
preschoolers that was independent of individual
differences in language ability. However, frequently
others have failed to document such associations
once the inﬂuence of covariates such as language
have been accounted for (e.g., Badenes, Estevan, &
Bacete, 2000; Braza et al., 2009; Diesendruck & Ben-
Eliyahu, 2006; Slaughter et al., 2002). Shedding
some light on an inconsistent literature, a recent
meta-analysis of 22 studies has found a signiﬁcant
positive, albeit modest, concurrent association
between ToM and children’s peer-rated social rela-
tionships (Slaughter et al., 2014). This meta-analysis
has demonstrated that there is a signiﬁcant rela-
tion between these two constructs, but the longitu-
dinal association and the underlying causal
relations between FB and social relationships is still
unclear.
Where longitudinal methods have been used,
there has been a tendency to focus on friendship
interactions (i.e., conversations, play) rather than
sociometric indices of social relationships (Asting-
ton & Jenkins, 2000; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). The
few longitudinal studies that have measured social
relationships using peer sociometric methods have
favored longitudinal and indirect inﬂuences of ToM
on social preference rather than straightforwardly
comparing concurrent with longitudinal associa-
tions (Banerjee et al., 2011; Caputi et al., 2012). No
studies have taken both measures of FB and social
preference during the 1st year of school and
followed children longitudinally. Simultaneously
examining the concurrent and longitudinal associa-
tions allows an examination of the potential incre-
mental impact of later gains in FB understanding
on social preference, which has far-reaching impli-
cations for the design and timing of interventions
that aim to train children’s FB understanding (e.g.,
Lecce, Bianco, Devine, Hughes, & Banerjee, 2014).
We have so far focused largely on the possibility
that FB causally inﬂuences social preference,
whether early on in children’s school experience or
consistently over time. As already noted, however,
there could be reciprocal relations between FB and
social relationships, so it is also essential to examine
whether early peer relationships exert a longitudi-
nal inﬂuence on later FB understanding (Hughes &
Leekam, 2004). Consistent with this order of inﬂu-
ence, Hughes and Dunn (1998) showed that dyadic
mental-state talk at 4 years uniquely predicted a
broad index of ToM (including FB) a year later,
lending support to the view that FB skills are fur-
ther developed within friendship interactions, as
they are in family interactions (Ensor & Hughes,
2008). However, friendship per se is not the same
as social relationships as measured via sociometric
indices. The two constructs are strongly overlap-
ping (Bukowski, Pizzamiglio, Newcomb, & Hoza,
1996), but one can have friends without being well
liked, and studies that focus on preexisting friend-
ships inherently overlook children who do not have
friends. So it is important to determine whether
such reciprocal processes also operate in the
broader domain of social preference. In keeping
with this possibility, Banerjee et al. (2011) have
shown among older children that peer rejection has
a causal, longitudinal inﬂuence on their emerging
understanding of faux pas, which is an advanced
ToM skill that relies heavily on FB mastery (Baron-
Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999).
In light of such ﬁndings, we examine whether
social relationships early in children’s school experi-
ence are having a similar inﬂuence on their under-
standing of mind, as indexed by their understanding
of FB.
We focus speciﬁcally on children’s FB under-
standing, as in many previous studies, ﬁrst, because
it is a core feature of broader ToM development
(i.e., belief-desire psychology; Bartsch & Wellman,
1995) and, second, because the manner in which
ToM is assessed is tightly bound to a child’s age,
and FB understanding is the most salient ToM
insight for children between 4 and 5 years of age
(Hughes et al., 2000; Wellman et al., 2001). As chil-
dren get older, however, they rapidly approach ceil-
ing on conventional FB tasks, and this raises
challenging measurement issues regarding longitu-
dinal assessment of FB. Nevertheless, decades of
ToM research have clearly shown that whereas chil-
dren are relatively good at identifying FBs in sim-
ple tasks by 5 years, it takes longer for them to use
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their awareness of FB to reason effectively about
other commonplace psychological phenomena
(Hughes et al., 2000; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman,
2010). These tasks include nice/nasty surprise (de
Rosnay, Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004; Harris, John-
son, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989), second-
order FB (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), understanding
surprise per se (Ruffman & Keenan, 1996), and faux
pas understanding (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In
the current study, we were able to measure FB
directly in 5-year-olds using conventional tasks
because of the considerable individual differences
that still exist in children at that time (Hughes
et al., 2000; Wellman et al., 2001). After more than
a year in school, however, children were too old to
administer these FB tasks. At Time 2, therefore, we
operationalized children’s FB understanding using
the nice/nasty surprise paradigm because it was
age appropriate (Harris et al., 1989; Hughes et al.,
2000), it provides a valid and widely used measure
of FB mastery (de Rosnay et al., 2004; Hughes
et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2005), and despite
being an advanced FB measure, it is a simple proce-
dure that does not require children to engage in
complex recursive reasoning about mental states
(see Miller, 2009, for a discussion on second-order
FB).
In the nice/nasty surprise paradigm, children
are presented with a situation in which a protago-
nist expects that he will get what he wants (but a
nasty surprise awaits) or something he does not
want (but a nice surprise awaits). By 3 years of
age, children are adept at understanding how peo-
ple will feel based on desire fulﬁllment; they have
very little difﬁculty inferring someone’s emotion
based on a match between his or her desires and
a salient outcome (e.g., getting what you want;
Harris et al., 1989; Wellman, 1990). But when the
protagonist in the nice/nasty surprise task also
holds an FB (i.e., a mistaken expectation), research
shows that children are able to identify the protag-
onist’s FB before they see the relevance of his FB
for his desire fulﬁllment, that is, his feelings. Thus,
at 6 years of age, the nice/nasty surprise tasks is
quintessentially a measure of children’s advanced
FB reasoning because it assesses how they use their
knowledge of FB to modify their desire psychology
(Wellman, 1990). In fact, the nice/nasty surprise
task can also be administered as a straightforward
FB test by directing children’s attention to the pro-
tagonist’s belief rather than his feelings, but it has
been shown that this does not challenge children’s
advanced FB reasoning (de Rosnay et al., 2004;
Hughes et al., 2000).
By focusing our investigations on children’s abili-
ties to identify and reason speciﬁcally about FB, we
were able to directly compare this important feature
of ToM with other widely utilized indices of chil-
dren’s social understanding (Blair, 2005; Caputi
et al., 2012; de Rosnay et al., 2008). Few studies
directly compare the inﬂuence of different aspects
of social understanding on children’s social relation-
ships (although, see Cassidy et al., 2003; Denham,
McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990, in younger chil-
dren; and Braza et al., 2009), and many use com-
posite measures of social understanding or ToM
(e.g., Caputi et al., 2012). While this latter approach
yields moderately robust global scores for ToM,
and captures a lot of variation, it lacks conceptual
precision because different kinds of child capacities
are merely combined, which circumvents the devel-
opmental transitions in FB reasoning we have
described above. Two domains of social under-
standing that have been shown to be of relevance
for children’s social behavior, and that have some-
times overlapped with FB measures, are the capac-
ity to recognize basic emotions, and empathic
orientation.
Conceptually, the recognition of basic emotions
is unlike most domains of ToM studied in child-
hood, which, despite being diverse, generally
require children to grasp the causes and conse-
quences of mental attitudes, and express these ideas
in ways that ﬁt with our everyday folk psychology
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; de Rosnay et al., 2008).
Recognizing basic emotion expressions, on the other
hand, taps into children’s perceptual sensitivity.
Although words are necessary to communicate
basic emotions, typically developing children have
clearly mastered such labels before 4 years of age
(Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2004). Notwithstanding
this early competence, accurate labeling of real
emotions (e.g., photographs of children expressing
emotion) has itself been shown to inﬂuence chil-
dren’s social interactions: It seems that sensitivity to
others’ expressions may be a distinctive feature of
social understanding (Izard et al., 2001; Schultz,
Izard, Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001). Given the
conceptual and methodological differences in mea-
suring children’s FB, on one hand, and their abili-
ties to recognize and label basic emotions, on the
other hand, it is necessary to ask if these factors
exert independent inﬂuences on children’s social
relationships. We thus assess them independently.
While children’s empathic orientation has some-
times been directly equated with FB understanding
(i.e., cognitive empathy; Blair, 2005), it is also fre-
quently measured as a set of behavioral dispositions
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or proclivities, such as in a teacher report of child
behavior with peers. It has long been recognized that
just because a child understands someone else’s
perspective does not guarantee he or she will act
altruistically or sympathetically toward that person
(Underwood & Moore, 1982). It is also important to
examine empathic behavioral tendencies in conjunc-
tion with a conceptual understanding of mind (e.g.,
FB) to better understand how children are perceived
by their peers. Indeed, empathic orientation has also
been shown to positively inﬂuence children’s social
conduct (Eisenberg, 2000).
Finally, the putative association between FB and
social relationships may in fact turn on covariation
between these factors and children’s verbal abilities.
Both ToM (Astington & Baird, 2005) and, to a lesser
extent, social relationships (Slaughter et al., 2002)
have been shown to draw on linguistic skill even
among typically developing children, with linguisti-
cally sophisticated children performing better on
most social understanding tasks, in particular, FB
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007).
To summarize, three distinctive perspectives
emerge on likely relations between children’s FB
and their social relationships. (a) If children are
highly dependent on their FB to read and respond
to complex real-life social interactions, and FB
understanding is stable, then FB should robustly
predict children’s social preference during the 1st
year of school, and also longitudinally. That is,
Time 1 FB will be correlated with Time 1 social
preference, in addition to predicting Time 2 social
preference. (b) However, if early FB sets in motion
a pattern of peer relations that become self-sustain-
ing, as might be implied by Astington’s (2001)
question, then although we should expect to see an
early inﬂuence of FB on children’s social preference
when they start school, stability in peer preference
is nonetheless likely best understood in terms of the
inherent stability of social systems rather than the
continuous inﬂuence of individual differences in
child factors. That is, while Time 1 FB would be
expected to correlate with Time 1 social preference,
only Time 1 social preference will predict Time 2
social preference. (c) Finally, although there is less
evidence of such effects in the literature, it remains
important to consider the possibility that the rela-
tion between FB and social preference is reciprocal,
and therefore we would expect that early success or
difﬁculty with peers may create environments that
support or impede the growth of children’s social
understanding. We therefore examine the longitudi-
nal inﬂuence of social preference on children’s
increasing mastery of FB reasoning in the 2nd year
of school, as measured on the nice/nasty surprise
advanced ToM task (Hughes et al., 2000). That is,
we examine whether Time 1 social preference pre-
dicts Time 2 advanced FB.
Against this framework, we also examine the
inﬂuence of emotion expression recognition and
empathic orientation on children’s social preference,
while controlling for verbal abilities. In doing so,
we hope to clarify whether FB in fact plays an inde-
pendent role in children’s social adjustment during
the ﬁrst years of formal schooling.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 114 Australian children
(58 boys) recruited during their 1st year of formal
schooling (Time 1) from three inner suburban
schools in a major Australian city. One year later
(Time 2), the sample comprised 106 (93%) of the
originally tested children. A relatively homoge-
neous, middle-class sample was sought to minimize
diversity in privilege or economic hardship. Schools
were identiﬁed for recruitment based on average
house prices in the area, and Estimates of Personal
Income for Small Areas provided by the Australian
Bureau of Statistics. All participants had written
parental consent. The mean age at Time 1 was
5 years 7 months (SD = 5.1 months, range = 55–
77 months), and the mean age at Time 2 was
6 years 8 months (SD = 4.8 months, range = 70–
90 months).
The three schools initially approached agreed to
take part, and all children entering the schools for
the ﬁrst time (Time 1) were invited to participate, a
single class intake in each case. Recruitment and
testing was staggered over 2 years in two schools,
resulting in ﬁve groups of children. While most
children (97%) had attended preschool at least
2 days a week, none of the recruited schools were
associated with preschools or had reception classes,
and children came from many different care
arrangements, as is typical in this area.
Ninety-eight percent of children had at least one
parent who had completed high school or had
vocational training, and 58% had at least one parent
who had also completed tertiary education. There
were no exclusion criteria and no child experienced
serious economic disadvantage. Children came
from a mixture of ethnic backgrounds common to
the local areas and all spoke English ﬂuently. No
children were identiﬁed by the school as having
developmental disabilities at the time of testing.
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Materials
Verbal Ability
The Test of Early Language Development–3
(TELD; Hresko, Reid, & Hammill, 1999) was used
as an assessment of children’s verbal mental ability
(VMA) at both time points. The TELD is a measure
of both expressive and receptive language skills,
which were summed to create a global score. This
comprehensive index of language development was
chosen because such measures demonstrate strong-
er relations with children’s FB than measures of
receptive vocabulary (Milligan et al., 2007). Chil-
dren’s raw, unstandardized scores were used in the
analysis.
Time 1 FB
Six FB understanding ToM tasks were adminis-
tered. There were two unexpected contents items
based on Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987), and
two unexpected transfer items based on Wimmer
and Perner (1983). In both unexpected transfer and
unexpected contents items, children were asked a
reality control question, for example, “What is
really inside the box?” in addition to a target FB
test question, for example, “What does Lily think is
inside the box?” To be awarded 1 point for the FB
tasks, children had to correctly answer both the
reality control question and the target FB question.
In addition, children were given one nice and one
nasty surprise task (described next), but they were
only scored on the basis of their response to the FB
question, a variation on the unexpected contents FB
task (Hughes et al., 2000). One point was awarded
for correctly identifying the protagonist’s FB and
correctly identifying the true contents of the con-
tainer (reality control question).
Children performed similarly on the six FB tasks
and had little trouble with the control questions
(> 98% pass). Thus, children received an FB score
from 0 to 6. Internal consistency for the six FB items
was high, a = .78.
Each task was read aloud by the experimenter
and supplemented with color drawings.
Time 2 Advanced FB
Four advanced FB tasks were administered—two
nice surprise and two nasty surprise—based on
Hughes et al. (2000) and de Rosnay et al. (2004).
The nice/nasty surprise advanced FB tasks are widely
used and highly reliable (Hughes et al., 2000;
Hughes et al., 2005). All four tasks required chil-
dren to attribute a feeling to a story protagonist
based on the match between his or her desires (e.g.,
He likes Coke) and his or her expectation (e.g., He
[mistakenly] thinks he will get Coke; Harris et al.,
1989). For example, to pass one of the nice surprise
stories, children had to attribute a negative feeling
(e.g., sadness or disappointment) to the protagonist
on basis of the (false) belief that he will receive a
hated food, when in fact the child knows he will
receive a favorite snack. Two tasks contained an
unexpected transfer FB (one nice surprise) and two
contained an unexpected contents FB (one nice sur-
prise). Children were awarded a score of 1 for each
task if they passed the reality control question (see
above), the target FB question (see above), and
attribute a suitable feeling to the protagonist based
on his or her desire/preference and FB (de Rosnay
et al., 2004).
Children had little trouble with the control ques-
tions (> 99% pass), and as expected based on previ-
ous research, they approached ceiling on the FB
question (Harris et al., 1989): Eighty-seven (83%)
children passed four FB questions. Thus, children
solely received an advanced FB score between 0 and
4. Internal consistency for the four items was
acceptable, a = .65.
Each task was read aloud by the experimenter
and supplemented with color drawings.
Recognition of Emotional Expressions (Emotion)
At both time points, children were administered
a task assessing their ability to match emotional
facial expressions with correct labels, based on the
Assessment of Children’s Emotion Skills (20 photo-
graphs of school-aged children expressing different
facial expressions; Schultz, Izard, & Bear, 2004). To
ensure comprehension, children were initially asked
to label two expressions: joy and sadness. All chil-
dren passed. Children were then shown ﬁve emo-
tion expressions together at a time (four blocks: joy,
sadness, anger, fear, and surprise) and were asked
to point to each nominated expression (in a preor-
dered random sequence). Children did not have to
produce labels; they merely had to indicate their
best answer. One point was awarded for each cor-
rectly identiﬁed emotion. Internal consistency across
all individual trials (20 trials) was acceptable, Time
1 a = .66 and Time 2 a = .61.
Empathic Orientation (Empathy)
At both times, teachers rated children’s empathic
orientation using a widely used questionnaire based
2394 Fink, Begeer, Hunt, and de Rosnay
on the scale developed by Eisenberg et al. (1998)
and adapted by Findlay, Girardi, and Coplan
(2006). Children were rated by different teachers at
each time point. The teacher-rated empathy scale
consisted of six items (e.g., “This child usually feels
sympathy for other children who are upset or
sad”), measured on a 3-point Likert scale,
0 = doesn’t apply, 1 = sometimes applies, and 2 = cer-
tainly applies. Internal consistency was high, Time 1
a = .87 and Time 2 a = .80.
Social (Peer) Preference
Social preference was assessed using the peer
nomination sociometric interview technique devel-
oped by Coie, Dodge, and Coppotelli (1982) at
Time 1 and Time 2 to provide information on chil-
dren’s relative social standing in their peer environ-
ment. Following accepted procedures, children
were asked to nominate three children in their class
that “they like to play with the most” and three
children “they do not like to play with” using pho-
tographs of their peers as prompts. Cross-gender
nominations were permitted (Graziano, Keane, &
Calkins, 2007). Each child’s individual like most and
like least scores were standardized within classroom
to take into account different-sized peer groups. In
the two schools where recruitment took place over
2 years, children were only permitted to nominate
peers from their own year level. Social preference
was calculated by subtracting classroom-standard-
ized like least from standardized like most nomina-
tions, an index of peer-rated social standing that
has been widely used in the developmental litera-
ture.
Between 55% and 82% (M = 68%) of children
were recruited from each class. Given the longitudi-
nal nature of the study opt-out recruitment was not
permissible as determined by the ethics board. Chil-
dren remained in the same classroom and year
groups at Time 2 and therefore had access to the
same peer group at each time point, an important
feature of the study. Between Time 1 and Time 2,
eight children left their school; these children did
not differ signiﬁcantly from the Time 2 sample in
terms of social preference, t(113) = .77, p = .440.
Procedure
Children were seen individually in a quiet room
at school over two sessions at both time points (i.e.,
four sessions). The mean duration between the ﬁrst
session of each time point was 346 days
(SD = 25.8 days). At both time points, the ﬁrst
session was scheduled for early in the third of four
school terms to ensure that children knew their
peers reasonably well (approximately 6 months). At
Time 1, children were photographed and they com-
pleted the emotion task and TELD–3 in the ﬁrst
session. In the second session, children were pre-
sented with the FB tasks and the sociometric inter-
view. The mean duration between Sessions 1 and 2
at Time 1 was 80 days (SD = 43.7 days). At Time 2,
all children completed the TELD–3, advanced FB,
and emotion tasks in the ﬁrst session, and the
sociometric interview in the second session. The
mean duration between Sessions 1 and 2 at Time 2
was 50 days (SD = 33.7 days). Most children com-
pleted all tasks, but due to absence from school and
scheduled classroom activities some children were
unable to complete every session or every task
within a session. At both time points, teachers com-
pleted the empathy questionnaire at the end of each
school year, and knew the children very well.
Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 and
bivariate relations between study variables are pre-
sented in Table 2. There was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between boys and girls on any study variable,
ts < 1.76, ps > .081. Several features of Table 2 are
noteworthy. First, there was strong stability in
VMA, and between FB and advanced FB. These
two measures were also robustly correlated concur-
rently and longitudinally, replicating the known
association between ToM and VMA (Milligan et al.,
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Measure n M SD Range
Time 1
VMA 113 60.46 5.16 44–77
FB 113 4.23 1.87 0–6
Emotion 112 14.60 2.99 5–20
Empathy 111 9.66 2.53 1–12
Social preference 114 .02 1.67 4.42–3.34
Time 2
VMA 104 64.11 4.40 53–75
Advanced FB 106 1.97 1.13 0–4
Emotion 106 15.82 2.54 7–20
Empathy 106 8.48 2.81 0–12
Social preference 106 0 1.66 4.55–4.33
Note. VMA = verbal mental ability; FB = false-belief; emo-
tion = recognition of emotional expressions.
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2007). Second, there was remarkable stability in
social preference. Finally, FB at Time 1 was concur-
rently and longitudinally associated with social
preference. However, Time 1 social preference was
not signiﬁcantly associated with advanced FB.
Three planned hierarchical regression models
were constructed to evaluate the three perspectives,
formulated in the Introduction, that outline possible
patterns of association between FB and social pref-
erence. Regression Models 1 and 2 comprise an
examination of the inﬂuence of FB on concurrent
and longitudinal social preference (Perspective 1).
Additionally, Model 2 also allows for an examina-
tion of Perspective 2, the longitudinal role of FB on
social preference over and above stability in chil-
dren’s social preference scores by including social
preference at Time 1 on the third and ﬁnal step of
the model. Finally, Model 3 examines the inverse
relation between FB and social preference (Perspec-
tive 3) by examining the inﬂuence of Time 1 social
preference on Time 2 advanced FB understanding.
Although there were no sex differences on any
study variable, sex was nonetheless controlled for
in the regression models as in previous studies
(Braza et al., 2009) and the omission of sex did not
affect the overall results reported below. Addition-
ally, age was included at the ﬁrst step of all regres-
sion models; ﬁndings remained unchanged when
this variable was removed so the more parsimoni-
ous models are reported.
In the ﬁrst model, predicting Time 1 social pref-
erence, sex and VMA were entered on the ﬁrst step
and FB, emotion, and empathy were entered on
the second step (see Model 1, Table 3). The model
was only signiﬁcant with the inclusion of the
second step, F(5, 104) = 6.77, p < .001. It is notable
that FB, emotion, and empathy all made an inde-
pendent signiﬁcant contribution to the prediction
of children’s social preference and, furthermore,
that each contribution was of a relatively similar
magnitude.
Table 2
Summary of Bivariate Correlations Between Linguistic Ability, False Belief, Emotion Expression Labeling, Empathy, and Social Preference at Time
1 and Time 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. T1 VMA — .52** .37** .09 .17 .61** .52** .30** .14 .17
2. T1 FB — .25** .16 .35** .49** .58** .15 .15 .33**
3. T1 emotion — .09 .31** .34** .33** .31** .11 .31**
4. T1 empathy — .31** .14 .02 .00 .27** .20*
5. T1 social preference — .22* .10 .15 .21* .72**
6. T2 VMA — .38** .25* -.03 .20*
7. T2 advanced FB — .11 .13 .25*
8. T2 emotion — .08 .07
9. T2 empathy — .26**
10. T2 social preference —
Note. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; VMA = verbal mental ability; FB = false belief; emotion = recognition of emotional expressions.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 3
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Social Preference
at T1 (Model 1) and T2 (Model 2)
Variable
Model 1
T1 social
preference
Model 2
T2 social
preference
ΔR2 b ΔR2 b
Step 1 .05 .03
Sex .15 .05
T1 VMA .15 .17
Step 2 .19** .16**
Sex .08 .02
T1 VMA -.10 .09
T1 FB .29** .31**
T1 emotion .24* .24**
T1 empathy .23** .15
Step 3 — .35**
Sex — .05
T1 VMA — .01
T1 FB — .10
T1 emotion — .08
T1 empathy — .02
T1 social preference — .68**
Total R2 .25** .54**
Note. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2; VMA = verbal mental ability;
FB = false belief; emotion = recognition of emotional expressions.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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In the second model, predicting social preference
at Time 2, the same overall approach was taken,
with the addition of Time 1 social preference on a
third step (see Model 2, Table 3). The ﬁrst step,
with sex and VMA, was not signiﬁcant. At the sec-
ond step, the overall model was signiﬁcant, F(5, 96)
= 4.58, p = .001, with both FB and emotion making
independent contributions to the longitudinal pre-
diction of social preference. The addition of Time 1
social preference on the third step further improved
model ﬁt, DF(1, 95) = 72.72, p < .001; however, only
Time 1 social preference was a signiﬁcant predictor
of Time 2 social preference at this step. Neither FB
nor Time 1 emotion was a signiﬁcant longitudinal
predictor of Time 2 social preference over and
above the stability of social preference.
Although FB and Time 1 emotion failed to make
independent contributions to Time 2 social prefer-
ence, the possibility remained that, combined, they
improved children’s Time 2 social preference even
when controlling for Time 1 social preference.
Therefore, a post hoc analysis was conducted along
the lines of Model 2 in which Time 1 social prefer-
ence was entered at the second step, and FB, Time
1 emotion, and Time 1 empathy were entered at the
ﬁnal step. The overall model statistics were identi-
cal to Model 2 but the third step conﬁrmed that the
addition of the social understanding variables in
the ﬁnal step did not make an overall improvement
to the model, F < 1, DR2 = .01.
A third model was constructed to examine the
possibility of a reciprocal relation, that is, the inﬂu-
ence of earlier social preference on advanced FB
(see Table 4). Thus, sex, Time 1 VMA, and Time 1
social preference were entered on the ﬁrst step;
Time 1 emotion and empathy were entered on the
second step; and FB was entered on the ﬁnal step.
At the ﬁrst step, only Time 1 VMA signiﬁcantly
predicted advanced FB, F(3, 98) = 12.42, p < .001.
At the second step, there was no change in the
overall signiﬁcance of the model, and neither Time
1 emotion nor empathy contributed to advanced
FB. The addition of Time 1 FB at the ﬁnal step sig-
niﬁcantly improved model ﬁt, DF(1, 95) = 23.02,
p < .001, and revealed that even after controlling
for other variables, FB was the strongest longitudi-
nal predictor of advanced FB. This adds consider-
able support to the conceptual coherence between
FB and advanced FB, and also speaks against a
simple reciprocal relation between FB and social
preference.
Despite poor evidence for reciprocal relations
(see Tables 2 and 4), a post hoc analysis was
conducted to examine concurrent relations between
advanced FB and Time 2 social preference, over
and above the longitudinal stability in social prefer-
ence, a conditional question. This approach was
taken because, in the context of stability in social
preference, it is of theoretical and practical impor-
tance to determine whether children who increased
or decreased in their social preference were also
those who had higher or lower advanced FB scores,
respectively. On the ﬁrst step, sex, Time 2 VMA,
and Time 1 social preference were entered. This
step was signiﬁcant, F(3, 100) = 36.97, p < .001,
R2 = .53. Only social preference at Time 1 predicted
social preference at Time 2, b = .72, p < .001, reﬂect-
ing the overarching stability. However, the addition
of advanced FB, as well as Time 2 emotion and
empathy, at the second step signiﬁcantly improved
model ﬁt, DF(3, 97) = 3.40, p = .021, DR2 = .05. At
this step, in addition to Time 1 social preference,
b = .70, p < .001, there was a signiﬁcant association
between advanced FB and Time 2 social preference,
b = .19, p = .014. The inclusion of an advanced FB
and Time 1 social preference interaction term on a
ﬁnal step did not signiﬁcantly improve model ﬁt,
DF(1, 96) = .05, p = .832, DR2 = .00.
Table 4
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Advanced False
Belief at Time 2
Variable
Model 3
Advanced FB
ΔR2 b
Step 1 .28**
Sex .03
T1 VMA .51**
T1 social preference .04
Step 2 .02
Sex .03
T1 VMA .46**
T1 social preference .00
T1 emotion .15
T1 empathy .02
Step 3 .14**
Sex .00
T1 VMA .24*
T1 social preference .12
T1 emotion .14
T1 empathy .02
T1 FB .47**
Total R2 .43**
Note. VMA = verbal mental ability; FB = false belief; emo-
tion = recognition of emotional expressions.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Discussion
The current study is the ﬁrst longitudinal investiga-
tion of the relation between social cognition and
social relationships over the ﬁrst 2 years of chil-
dren’s formal schooling. Given the central position
of FB understanding in research on children’s social
cognition (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman et al.,
2001), and the presumed importance of FB for chil-
dren’s social relationships (e.g., Eggum et al., 2011),
this study is uniquely placed to contribute to our
understanding of the longitudinal processes that
underpin children’s social relationships and inform
interventions to support children at risk of social
isolation or rejection from the peer group.
Our ﬁndings clearly demonstrate that during the
1st year of school, when children are establishing
new relationships, those with better FB are more
likely to be rated positively by their peers; on bal-
ance, they are more likely to be judged as someone
whom others like to play with, or less likely to be
judged as someone whom others do not like to play
with. This ﬁnding is consistent with the widely held
view that FB exerts a direct inﬂuence on children’s
social relations, and is consistent with the results of
the recent meta-analysis by Slaughter et al. (2014)
on the concurrent association between FB and social
preference. Additionally, the current study is the
ﬁrst to demonstrate that over and above the impact
of FB on children’s social preference, children’s
capacities to recognize emotion expressions and
their proclivities to behave empathically also have
inﬂuences on their social preference that are of a
similar magnitude to FB. Furthermore, our data
suggest that this relation does not turn on chil-
dren’s verbal abilities, which covary profoundly
with FB (Milligan et al., 2007). These ﬁndings are
encouraging because they conﬁrm, in a single
study, that various aspects of children’s social
understanding—FB, emotion recognition, and
empathy—previously identiﬁed in the extant litera-
ture as independent inﬂuences on social preference
(de Rosnay et al., 2008; Dunn, 2000), are likely
exerting a simultaneous inﬂuence on social prefer-
ence.
Examining the longitudinal impact of FB, the
current study showed that FB was robustly related
to children’s social preference in the 2nd year of
school, consistent with the view that FB has an
ongoing inﬂuence on children’s social preference.
Again, this relation was independent of children’s
ability to recognize emotional expressions or their
verbal abilities. However, the inﬂuence of early FB
on later social preference was not independent of
children’s earlier social preference. Thus, consistent
with Astington’s (2001) question, the ﬁndings from
the current study may be interpreted to suggest
that FB does set in motion a pattern of peer rela-
tionships that become self-sustaining: Once children
have established themselves in a new peer group,
their position in this group is relatively stable. This
is an important ﬁnding and demonstrates the pro-
found ongoing inﬂuence of children’s position in a
social group that, once established, appears to
largely take on a life of its own (Denham & Holt,
1993; Jiang & Cillessen, 2005). That none of the
Time 1 child measures, whether independently or
combined, predicted later social preference, and the
strength of the effect suggest that other unmeasured
mechanisms or processes may be working to main-
tain social hierarchies and organization. For exam-
ple, it is plausible that as children get older their
expectations about their own role within a group
become increasingly galvanized and may be mani-
fested as a social identity or self-concept (e.g., Har-
ter, 1982) that somewhat structures their future
social encounters (Sandstrom & Coie, 1999). While
this is an intriguing possibility, there is little
research to shed light on how indices of social rela-
tionships (e.g., social preference, peer acceptance,
social status) translate across different social envi-
ronments in childhood.
To further investigate the interplay between FB
and social preference within the context of robust
stability in our measure of social preference, the
association between advanced FB and Time 2 social
preference was examined over and above the stabil-
ity in social preference. For children of equal social
preference at Time 1, those performing better on
advanced FB were also more likely to have
improved their social preference at Time 2. This
ﬁnding is open to various interpretations. In keep-
ing with the conventional view (e.g., Slaughter
et al., 2002), it can be taken as further evidence of
the direct inﬂuence of FB on (change in) social pref-
erence. However, the results suggest another possi-
bility; that is, children whose social preference
changed (for whatever reason) were likely to expe-
rience a corresponding change in their advanced FB
understanding. Again, these inﬂuences could be
reciprocal. In future research, it will be important to
understand how individual trajectories of FB under-
standing over time are related to social preference,
a task that requires more than two time points.
In addition to examining the longitudinal inﬂu-
ence of FB on later social preference, the current
study also examined the possibility that children’s
early success with peers may create conditions that
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support or impede the growth of their FB (Banerjee
et al., 2011). There was little evidence for such an
inverse relation between FB and social relation-
ships. This ﬁnding suggests, at least in typical 5-
year-old children in a stable social environment,
that FB understanding shapes social interactions
rather than social interactions creating a context for
the development of FB. However, the interplay
between FB and social context at this age may still
be reciprocal; it is plausible that children’s interper-
sonal experiences at this age will begin to inform
the development of more complex FB reasoning,
such as faux pas understanding. Indeed, such a pat-
tern of association between early social relation-
ships and later faux pas understanding has been
demonstrated by Banerjee et al. (2011). Further
research on the longitudinal association between FB
and children’s social relationships during the school
years is clearly necessary.
Implications and Future Directions
Starting school is an important sociodevelopmen-
tal juncture that roughly corresponds to a concep-
tual shift in children’s abilities to identify FBs and
to use FB reasoning to better understand others
(Harris et al., 1989; Wellman, 1990). It is therefore
of practical importance to clarify the relation
between FB and children’s social relationships. The
ﬁndings of the current study imply that if we want
to make the most impact on social relationships we
should support children’s early understanding of
FB when they enter school. Encouragingly, how-
ever, improvements in FB understanding in later
years also appears to positively inﬂuence social
preference, albeit considerably more modestly than
stability in children’s existing social hierarchy.
It is also important, however, not to oversim-
plify the social challenges and opportunities facing
children, and imagine that FB understanding pro-
vides a singular explanation for children’s capaci-
ties. Indeed, the current study also suggests that in
addition to supporting FB understanding, helping
children’s emotion recognition and fostering their
empathy may have an equally important positive
impact on social relationships, over and above FB
understanding. Thus, as our ﬁndings and the ﬁnd-
ings of others (see de Rosnay et al., 2008, for a dis-
cussion) show there are many aspects of children’s
social understanding, including their understanding
of the causes and consequences of emotion and
other aspect of mental life (Banerjee et al., 2011;
Denham et al., 1990, 2003; Izard et al., 2001) that
likely contribute to their social relationships.
Additionally, FB may inﬂuence children’s social
relationships indirectly by, for example, supporting
effective prosocial behavior (Caputi et al., 2012). In
keeping with the early arguments of Wellman
(1990), the child’s mastery of FB has wide-ranging
ramiﬁcations, which includes changes to the way
we understand emotional phenomena. Thus, FB
understanding is often necessary to grasp others’
expressive, emotional behavior in terms of their idi-
osyncratic construal of reality. However, sophisti-
cated perspective taking skills are clearly not
always necessary for manifestly empathic behaviors,
such as those measured by empathic orientation in
the current study (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow,
Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Still, it is self-evident
that sophisticated perspective taking can be used to
put ourselves in a different kind of relation to
others, so that we experience empathy for them.
The current study, while making an important
and unique contribution to the literature, only
focused on one transition in children’s lives, that is,
the transition to formal schooling. To provide fur-
ther evidence for the conclusion drawn from this
study, a promising avenue will be to examine the
role of social understanding—including early ToM
(Wellman & Liu, 2004) and advanced ToM (Miller,
2009)—at various points when children change
social environments.
Limitations and Conclusion
A number of limitations of the current study must
be recognized. First, as discussed in the Introduction,
it was important that children experienced a rela-
tively stable school environment, without which it is
difﬁcult to evaluate the possibility that social organi-
zation becomes self-sustaining. However, recruit-
ment of all children within each class was not
possible nor was including nonparticipating children
on the class list for social preference nominations.
This resulted in a somewhat restricted peer group
for children’s social preference nominations, which
may have created a sampling bias and restricts the
validity of the social preference index. This sampling
issue limits the strength of our conclusions, although
there is no reason to assume that it was necessarily
biased toward over- or underestimating children’s
social preference. The more likely possibility is that
our sampling introduced additional error into the
estimation of social preference stability, although
Jiang and Cillessen (2005) report similar overall lev-
els of stability in their meta-analysis examining social
preference over time. Nevertheless, further research
on the longitudinal relation between FB and social
FB Understanding and Social Preference 2399
preference, including a greater proportion of chil-
dren from each class, would help to clarify our con-
clusions.
A second methodological challenge was the fact
that children’s social experiences prior coming to
school were relatively unknown. An important
strength of the current study was, fortuitously, the
fact that children arrive in their new school pre-
dominantly unknown to each other, allowing rea-
sonable conﬁdence that the Time 1 relations
documented reﬂect the inﬂuence of social under-
standing (FB, emotion, and empathy) on social pref-
erence, and not the reverse. However, this is not to
say that children’s prior social experience is not of
relevance to their social preference upon entering a
new school environment, and this is an important
question we could not address in the design of the
current study. Nevertheless, we can conclude that
that the social understanding skills children bring
with them to a new environment play an important
role in the formation of new relationships.
Third, in addition to FB, emotion recognition,
and empathy, there are numerous other child char-
acteristics (such as executive functioning, prosocial
behavior, and academic functioning) that have been
shown to be associated with social relationships at
school that, due to the size of the current study, did
not permit consideration (for a review see Rubin,
Bukowski, & Parker, et al., 2006). Of particular
importance is executive functioning, which has been
shown to play a crucial role in both ToM under-
standing (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes &
Ensor, 2007) and social relationships (e.g., Hughes,
White, Sharpen, & Dunn, 2000). As such, including
executive functioning in future longitudinal studies
examining ToM and social relationships will help
reﬁne the nature of the relation between these con-
structs over time.
Finally, it should be highlighted that children’s
empathy was assessed via teacher report, while
remaining measures were derived from child
report. While multimethod studies are typically
advised, the fact that teachers only contributed to
the ﬁndings via their empathy reports may have
inﬂuenced the ﬁndings of the current study.
Although this teacher-reported empathy measure
has been widely used (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000; Eisen-
berg et al., 1998; Findlay et al., 2006), teachers may
not always be privy to the range of children’s
empathic behaviors toward their peers, which may
have underestimated the role played by empathy in
children’s social relationships.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the current
study highlights the role of FB in establishing chil-
dren’s position in their social groups, and the
enduring nature of this social position. Given that
poor social relationships during the early school
years have been shown to have far-reaching impli-
cations for later relationships and adjustment, the
current longitudinal study provides a unique
insight into the role played by FB in the establish-
ment and maintenance of social relationships and
highlights the lasting power of peer group dynam-
ics, and by doing so provides practical implications
for the timing and design of interventions to pro-
mote positive social relationships.
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